Security, development and human rights: Normative, legal and policy challenges for the international drug control system

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Copied below are the abstract and conclusion from paper published last week in the International Journal of Drug Policy,  by Damon Barrett (Senior Human Right Analyst at IHRA), titled 'Security, development and human rights: Normative, legal and policy challenges for the international drug control system'.  In this important and groundbreaking commentary Barrett outlines a series of theoretical and practical challenges for the international drug control system, reconceptualizing it within a broader human rights law analysis.

A clear call for an Impact Assessment on international drug control policy is also made (in the conclusion see below). The full paper is available at the International Center on Human Rights and Drug Policy website (pdf)

Transform's Danny Kushlick (credited) was involved in developing the thinking behind the paper, and Transform's 'Blueprint for Regulation' is also cited along with our recent Impact Assessment briefing paper.

Abstract

This commentary addresses some of the challenges posed by the broader normative, legal and policy framework of the United Nations for the international drug control system. The ‘purposes and principles’ of the United Nations are presented and set against the threat based rhetoric of the drug control system and the negative consequences of that system. Some of the challenges posed by human rights law and norms to the international drug control system are also described, and the need for an impact assessment of the current system alongside alternative policy options is highlighted as a necessary consequence of these analyses.

Conclusion
International drug control, as currently formulated, may be conceptualised as an ‘international risk environment’ for the related damage to security, development and human rights that has been documented worldwide. The human rights risk is particularly clear. The first step in addressing this is to begin to shift the debate at the international level away from threat based rhetoric and towards meeting the aims of the UN. Based on modern debates concerning human security and human development, this demands consideration of more locally and culturally appropriate responses that place individuals and communities at the centre of drug policies. An impact assessment of the current approach is necessary, set against alternative policy options that may achieve better results in terms of security, development and human rights. That call is supported by international human rights law.

This assessment should have happened at the ten year review of international drug policy at the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs (March, 2009). Instead, the same policies, with some minor amendments to language, though hard fought by some of the more progressive governments, were prescribed for the next ten years. Indeed, it may be argued that advocating for a move towards policy based on the aims of the UN naively presumes genuine governmental support for those aims, when in fact other political agendas are more likely the drivers of current drug control efforts. This is likely the case for some governments. But this does not stall the discussion. Indeed, it is one more argument for reframing the debate so that the UN system, within which international drug control resides, is not one behind which these agendas may hide (Barrett & Nowak, 2009).

The Barrett and Nowak reference in the conclusion is for a book chapter titled 'The United Nations and Drug Policy: Towards a Human Rights Based Approach'  (Nov 2009) that explores some of the themes in the IJDP paper in more detail. Highly recommended, it is also available in full here on the International Center for Human Rights and Drug Policy website (pdf).  Barrett's co-author Manfred Nowak is the UNs Special Rapporteur on Torture.

World Drug Report Preface majors on legalisation

Below is the text from the Preface to World Drug Report 2009 - dominated by a detailed rebuttal of the growing calls for a debate on legal regulation of drug production and supply. We have deconstructed these kind of critiques so many times before, we won’t be doing it again here - other than to observe it is the same confused mix of misrepresentations, straw man arguments, and logical fallacies that we are used to hearing from the UNODC's drug warriors. The particularly strange thing here though is that some of the analysis of the problem, the critique at least, is actually fairly good - it's where it leads that is so extraordinary....

See previous for comprehensive deconstruction:

• UNODC mugged by reality
• UNintended Consequences - side effects and contra indications of global prohibition
  
• Fear prevails at the UN as voices for drug law reform are smeared
  
• UN bodies betray principles of peace by supporting the war on drugs
  
• Afghan Opium and the Emperor’s New Clothes
  
• The opium war's front line: Afghanistan, Iran and Hampshire
  
• UNODC director goes to Amsterdam: the lost report
  
• UNODC Director declares international drug control system is not ‘fit for purpose’
  
• UNODC director describes DPA event as '1000 lunatics', 'obviously on drugs'
  
• When all else fails: blame Amy Winehouse
  
• UNODC director (lamb) addresses the DPA (slaughter)
  
• UNODC ramps up the weird drug warrior rhetoric

Firstly, it might be useful to view this preface as a barometer of the debate globally, and of Transform and other reform NGOs having a real impact on the international debate at the highest levels, including the UNODC. It is a reflection of the progress the reform movement has made that the legalization/regulation issue takes up so much of the space in the preface, and that the UNODC feels the need to go on the defensive this prominently.

Secondly, we would suggest that it is indicative of an institutional problem at UNODC, that something as internally inconsistent as this passes muster and is allowed into the public domain. They fully acknowledge that prohibition, under the auspices of the UN drug agencies and international drug control infrastructure, has been a generational disaster on multiple fronts - and yet then call for more of the same, brushing off those who call for a debate on alternatives with the offensive and childish smear of being 'pro-drugs'. Costa has a seemingly unique politician's ability to be simultaneously insightful and manifestly wrong, demonstrating a similar trick with those who challenge him by being both conciliatory and offensive.

Thirdly and last, it is not all bad. The text makes clear reference to the need to address wellbeing:

“The problem can only be solved by addressing the problem of slums and dereliction in our cities, through renewal of infrastructures and investment in people – especially by assisting the youth, who are vulnerable to drugs and crime, with education, jobs and sport.” (our emphasis)

So if the only answer to drug misuse is to deal with the social problems that underlie it - where does that leave all that punitive enforcement?

Preface to World Drug Report 2009

The end of the first century of drug control (it all started in Shanghai in 1909) coincided with the closing of the UNGASS decade (launched in 1998 by a General Assembly Special Session on Drugs). These anniversaries stimulated reflection on the effectiveness, and the limitations, of drug policy. The review resulted in the reaffirmation that illicit drugs continue to pose a health danger to humanity. That’s why drugs are, and should remain, controlled. With this sanction in mind, Member States confirmed unequivocal support for the UN Conventions that have established the world drug control system.

At the same time, UNODC has highlighted some negative, obviously unintended effects of drug control, foreshadowing a needed debate about the ways and means to deal with them. Of late, there has been a limited but growing chorus among politicians, the press, and even in public opinion saying: drug control is not working. The broadcasting volume is still rising and the message spreading.

Much of this public debate is characterized by sweeping generalizations and simplistic solutions. Yet, the very heart of the discussion underlines the need to evaluate the effectiveness of the current approach. Having studied the issue on the basis of our data, UNODC has concluded that, while changes are needed, they should be in favour of different means to protect society against drugs, rather than by pursuing the different goal of abandoning such protection.

A. What’s the repeal debate about?

Several arguments have been put forward in favour of repealing drug controls, based on (i) economic, (ii) health, and (iii) security grounds, and a combination thereof.

I. The economic argument for drug legalization says: legalize drugs, and generate tax income. This argument is gaining favour, as national administrations seek new sources of revenue during the current economic crisis.

This legalize and tax argument is un-ethical and uneconomical. It proposes a perverse tax, generation upon generation, on marginalized cohorts (lost to addiction) to stimulate economic recovery. Are the partisans of this cause also in favour of legalizing and taxing other seemingly intractable crimes like human trafficking? Modern-day slaves (and there are millions of them) would surely generate good tax revenue to rescue failed banks.

The economic argument is also based on poor fiscal logic: any reduction in the cost of drug control (due to lower law enforcement expenditure) will be offset by much higher expenditure on public health (due to the surge of drug consumption). The moral of the story: don’t make wicked transactions legal just because they are hard to control.

II. Others have argued that, following legalization, a health threat (in the form of a drug epidemic) could be avoided by state regulation of the drug market. Again, this is naive and myopic. First, the tighter the controls (on anything), the bigger and the faster a parallel (criminal) market will emerge – thus invalidating the concept.

Second, only a few (rich) countries could afford such elaborate controls. What about the rest (the majority) of humanity? Why unleash a drug epidemic in the developing world for the sake of libertarian arguments made by a pro-drug lobby that has the luxury of access to drug treatment? Drugs are not harmful because they are controlled – they are controlled because they are harmful; and they do harm whether the addict is rich and beautiful, or poor and marginalized.

Drug statistics keep speaking loud and clear. Past runaway growth has flattened out and the drug crisis of the 1990s seems under control. This 2009 Report provides further evidence that drug cultivation (opium and coca) are flat or down. Most importantly, major markets for opiates (Europe and South East Asia), cocaine (North America), and cannabis (North America, Oceania and Europe) are in decline. The increase in consumption of synthetic stimulants, particularly in East Asia and the Middle East, is cause for concern, although use is declining in developed countries.

III. The most serious issue concerns organized crime. All market activity controlled by the authority generates parallel, illegal transactions, as stated above. Inevitably, drug controls have generated a criminal market of macro- economic dimensions that uses violence and corruption to mediate between demand and supply. Legalize drugs, and organized crime will lose its most profitable line of activity, critics therefore say.

Not so fast. UNODC is well aware of the threats posed by international drug mafias. Our estimates of the value of the drug market (in 2005) were ground-breaking. The Office was also first to ring the alarm bell on the threat of drug trafficking to countries in West and East Africa, the Caribbean, Central America and the Balkans. In doing so we have highlighted the security menace posed by organized crime, a matter now periodically addressed by the UN Security Council.

Having started this drugs/crime debate, and having pondered it extensively, we have concluded that these drug-related, organized crime arguments are valid. They must be addressed. I urge governments to recalibrate the policy mix, without delay, in the direction of more controls on crime, without fewer controls on drugs. In other words, while the crime argument is right, the conclusions reached by its proponents are flawed.

Why? Because we are not counting beans here: we are counting lives. Economic policy is the art of counting beans (money) and handling trade-offs: inflation vs. employment, consumption vs. savings, internal vs. external balances. Lives are different. If we start trading them off, we end up violating somebody’s human rights. There cannot be exchanges, no quid-pro-quos, when health and security are at stake: modern society must, and can, protect both these assets with unmitigated determination.

I appeal to the heroic partisans of the human rights cause worldwide, to help UNODC promote the right to health of drug addicts: they must be assisted and reintegrated into society. Addiction is a health condition and those affected by it should not be imprisoned, shot-at or, as suggested by the proponent of this argument, traded off in order to reduce the security threat posed by international mafias. Of course, the latter must be addressed, and below is our advice.

B. A better policy mix

The crime/drugs nexus was the subject of a Report entitled Organized Crime and its Threat to Security: tackling a disturbing consequence of drug control1 that I presented to the Commission on Narcotic Drugs and the Crime Commission in 2009. Because of the importance of this subject, we have devoted the thematic chapter of this year’s Report to examining further the issue and its policy implications. Here are some of the main points.

First, law enforcement should shift its focus from drug users to drug traffickers. Drug addiction is a health condition: people who take drugs need medical help, not criminal retribution. Attention must be devoted to heavy drug users. They consume the most drugs, cause the greatest harm to themselves and society – and generate the most income to drug mafias. Drug courts and medical assistance are more likely to build healthier and safer societies than incarceration. I appeal to Member States to pursue the goal of universal access to drug treatment as a commitment to save lives and reduce drug demand: the fall of supply, and associated crime revenues, will follow. Let’s progress towards this goal in the years ahead, and then assess its beneficial impact on the next occasion Member States will meet to review the effectiveness of drug policy (2015).

Second, we must put an end to the tragedy of cities out of control. Drug deals, like other crimes, take place mostly in urban settings controlled by criminal groups. This problem will worsen in the mega-cities of the future, if governance does not keep pace with urbanization.

Yet, arresting individuals and seizing drugs for their personal use is like pulling weeds – it needs to be done again the next day. The problem can only be solved by addressing the problem of slums and dereliction in our cities, through renewal of infrastructures and investment in people – especially by assisting the youth, who are vulnerable to drugs and crime, with education, jobs and sport. Ghettos do not create junkies and the jobless: it is often the other way around. And in the process mafias thrive.

Third, and this is the most important point, governments must make use, individually and collectively, of the international agreements against uncivil society. This means to ratify and apply the UN Conventions against Organized Crime (TOC) and against Corruption (CAC), and related protocols against the trafficking of people, arms and migrants. So far, the international community has not taken these international obligations seriously. While slum dwellers suffer, Africa is under attack, drug cartels threaten Latin America, and mafias penetrate bankrupt financial institutions, junior negotiators at these Conventions’ Conferences of the Parties have been arguing about bureaucratic processes and arcane notions of inclusiveness, ownership, comprehensiveness, and non-ranking. There are large gaps in the implementation of the Palermo and the Merida Conventions, years after their entry into force, to the point that a number of countries now face a crime situation largely caused by their own choice. This is bad enough.

Worse is the fact that, quite often vulnerable neighbors pay an even greater price. There is much more our countries can do to face the brutal force of organized crime: the context within which mafias operate must also be addressed.

•• Money-laundering is rampant and practically unopposed, at a time when interbank-lending has dried up.

The recommendations devised to prevent the use of financial institutions to launder criminal money, today are honored mostly in the breach. At a time of major bank failures, money doesn’t smell, bankers seem to believe. Honest citizens, struggling in a time of economic hardship, wonder why the proceeds of crime – turned into ostentatious real estate, cars, boats and planes – are not seized.

•• Another context deserving attention concerns one of humanity’s biggest assets, the internet. It has changed our life, especially the way we conduct business, communication, research and entertainment. But the web has also been turned into a weapon of mass destruction by criminals (and terrorists). Surprisingly, and despite the current crime wave, calls for new international arrangements against money-laundering and cyber-crime remain un-answered. In the process, drug policy gets the blame and is subverted.

C. A double “NO”

To conclude, transnational organized crime will never be stopped by drug legalization. Mafias coffers are equally nourished by the trafficking of arms, people and their organs, by counterfeiting and smuggling, racketeering and loan-sharking, kidnapping and piracy, and by violence against the environment (illegal logging, dumping of toxic waste, etc). The drug/crime trade-off argument, debated above, is no other than the pursuit of the old drug legalization agenda, persistently advocated by the pro-drug-lobby (Note that the partisans of this argument would not extend it to guns whose control – they say – should actually be enforced and extended: namely, no to guns, yes to drugs).

So far the drug legalization agenda has been opposed fiercely, and successfully, by the majority of our society. Yet, anti-crime policy must change. It is no longer sufficient to say: no to drugs. We have to state an equally vehement: no to crime.

There is no alternative to improving both security and health. The termination of drug control would be an epic mistake. Equally catastrophic is the current disregard of the security threat posed by organized crime.

Antonio Maria Costa
Executive Director
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

Updates and further info:

25.06.09

17.00
Transform quoted in the Guardian coverage: UN report shows fall in opium and cocaine production

18.30
Law Enforcement Against Prohibition have issued a press statement and
have launched a letter writing campaign in response to the UNODC arguments.

UN Office on Drugs and Crime admits it is at war with itself

News release

24th June 2009

The World Drug Report 2009, the flagship annual publication of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), will be launched in Washington DC on 24 June. Launched in the run up to World Drug Day on 26th June, the report provides detailed descriptions of trends in world drug markets. The report is likely to repeat the fact that the drug control system creates huge unintended consequences.

Transform, an NGO with special consultative status with the UN, argues that it is the regime of global prohibition that has created and compounded what is generally thought of as the ‘drug problem’, and that the UNODC is in agreement about the problem, if not the solution. Transform argues that the war on drugs must be ended to enable legally regulated drug markets to be established .

Even the UNODC website admits:

“Global drug control efforts have had a dramatic unintended consequence: a criminal black market of staggering proportions. Organized crime is a threat to security. Criminal organizations have the power to destabilize society and Governments. The illicit drug business is worth billions of dollars a year, part of which is used to corrupt government officials and to poison economies.

Drug cartels are spreading violence in Central America, Mexico and the Caribbean. West Africa is under attack from narco-trafficking. Collusion between insurgents and criminal groups threatens the stability of West Asia, the Andes and parts of Africa, fuelling the trade in smuggled weapons, the plunder of natural resources and piracy.”

The World Drug Report has long been criticised as attempting to dress up the long-term systemic failure of the international drug control system as success, and for ignoring some of the system’s most catastrophic failings. Despite the ongoing attempts to put a positive spin on the data there is no hiding from the reality that the era of global drug prohibition, enshrined in the three UN drug conventions (1961, 1971 and 1988), has witnessed a consistent escalation in harms associated with illicit drug production, supply and use.

Not only has the international drug control infrastructure – by its own measures – consistently delivered the opposite of its stated aims (the creation of ‘a drug free world’ being further away than ever) but, as Antonio Costa (UNODC executive director) has repeatedly stated, it has created a series of disastrous ‘unintended consequences’. Costa describes how the drug control system that his office oversees has created the ‘huge criminal black market’ that turns over in excess of £160 billion a year that has devastated producer and transit countries, has displaced policy ‘from public health to enforcement’ and caused the ‘balloon effect’ in which the problem is not eliminated but merely moved from one region to another.

Indeed the UN drug agencies are increasingly isolated from the UN family and at odds with the principles and practices of other UN agencies, whose work is built upon the pillars of human security, human development and human rights. Illustrating the point, a World Health Organisation report stated only last week that:

“The first two [drug] conventions predate the HIV/AIDS epidemic, while the third one predates the explosive global growth of injection drug use. Hence, while they benefit from considerable international support, these conventions my need to be revised today because some of their provisions affect the control of the HIV epidemic.”

Danny Kushlick, Head of Policy at Transform said:

“UNODC is officially at war with itself. The Executive Director has admitted repeatedly that the UNODC oversees the very system that gifts the vast illegal drug market to violent criminal profiteers, with disastrous consequences. The UNODC is effectively creating the problem it is claiming to eliminate. Mr Costa has identified five major ‘unintended consequences’ of the drug control system. Is there a time limit on how long a consequence remains ‘unintended’? Aren’t they now just ‘consequences’?”

“On the supply side fragile states like Afghanistan, Colombia and Guinea Bissau are drawn deeper into the illegal market where their profound underlying social and economic problems are compounded. Whilst for the rich consumer countries, like the US and UK, the illicit nature of trade is a catalyst for drug dealing and turf war violence, with the collateral damage inflicted on their more vulnerable neighbours, such as Mexico.”

He concluded:

“Only by ending our politically driven war on drugs can we hope to address the underlying sickness of producer, transit and consumer countries alike. In the short term, the UN and its member states should be obliged to conduct transparent impact assessments of their continued commitment to the Conventions with a view to acting on the evidence that they garner. In the longer term, the conventions need to be adapted, specifically allowing the flexibility for states, should they democratically decide, to explore legal regulation of drug production and supply. Until then the conventions will continue to undermine development, security and human rights.”

ENDS

Contact:

• Danny Kushlick, Head of Policy and Communications 07970 174747
• Steve Rolles, Head of Research 07980 213943

Notes for Editors:

• Transform is an NGO with UN ECOSOC special consultative status
• The WHO report quoted above is the 2009 Asia Pacific Report: ’Assessment of compulsory treatment of people who use drugs in Cambodia, China, Malaysia and Viet Nam: An application of selected human rights principles’
• The Costa quotes about unintended consequences come from the UNODC report "Making drug control 'fit for purpose': Building on the UNGASS decade

Updates 25.06.09:

17.00
Transform quoted in the Guardian coverage: UN report shows fall in opium and cocaine production

The WHO cocaine report the US didn't want you to see

Update 18.06.09: This blog post has resulted in mainstream media coverage of this story in the Guardian (by Ben Goldacre and George Monbiot) and an editorial in the Vancouver Sun: Suppressed report raises questions about drug policy. It also appeared on the front page of Reddit attracting 500+ comments and pulling in 60k hits in 24 hours


The largest ever study of cocaine use around the globe was carried out in the early 90's by the UN World Health Organisation (WHO) and funded by the UN Inter-regional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI), but under pressure from the US its publication was suppressed when it became clear the report's findings were in direct conflict with the myths, stereotypes and propaganda that prop up the war on drugs (read the complete leaked report here).

In March 1995 WHO/UNICRI released a briefing kit summarising the key conclusions, as a curtain raiser to the report's imminent publication.

• "Health problem; from the use of legal substances, particularly alcohol and tobacco, are greater than health problems from cocaine use.
• Few experts describe cocaine as invariably harmful to health. Cocaine-related problems are widely perceived to be more common and more severe for intensive, high-dosage users and very rare and much less severe for occasional, low-dosage users." (pg. 1)

the coca plant

In a classic example of what happens when public health pragmatism collides with criminal justice dogma, just two months later, at the 48th World Health Assembly, the US representative to the WHO threatened to withdraw US funding for WHO research projects unless they 'would dissociate itself from the conclusions of the study' (read the relevant segment here). He said;

"The United States Government had been surprised to note that the package seemed to make a case for the positive uses of cocaine, claiming that use of the coca leaf did not lead to noticeable damage to mental or physical health, that the positive health effects of coca leaf chewing might be transferable from traditional settings to other countries and cultures, and that coca production provided financial benefits to peasants...


"... it [the US] took the view that the study on cocaine, evidence of WHO's support for harm-reduction programmes and previous WHO association with organizations that supported the legalization of drugs, indicated that its programme on substance abuse was heading in the wrong direction. The press package undermined the efforts of the international community to stamp out the illegal cultivation and production of coca, inter alia through international conventions.


"The United States Government considered that, if WHO activities relating to drugs failed to reinforce proven drug control approaches, funds for the relevant programmes should be curtailed. In view of the gravity of the matter, he asked the Director-General for an assurance that WHO would dissociate itself from the conclusions of the study and that, in substance abuse activities, an approach would not be adopted that could be used to justify the continued production of coca."

It's easy to see why the US would be so opposed to the study being published as it not only challenges a number of myths and stereotypes about cocaine use, but it is highly critical of a number of US-backed policies. The report specifically highlights the criticism that supply reduction and enforcement policies are not working and that alternatives needs to be explored;

"The largest future issue is whether international organisations, such as WHO and the United Nations Drug Control Programme, and national governments will continue to focus on supply reduction approaches such as crop destruction and substitution and law enforcement efforts in the face of mounting criticism and cynicism about the effectiveness of these approaches. Countries such as Australia, Bolivia, Canada and Colombia are now interested in examining a range of options to legalize and decriminalize the personal use and possession of cocaine and other related products. There needs to be more assessment of the adverse effects of current policies and strategies and development of innovative approaches." (pg. 30)


"The studies identified strict limitations to drug control policies which rely almost exclusively on repressive measures. Current national and local approaches which over-emphasize punitive drug control measures may actually contribute to the development of heath-related problems. An increase in the adoption of more humane, compassionate responses such as education, treatment and rehabilitation programmes is seen as a desirable counterbalance to the overreliance on law enforcement measures." (pg. 29)

The study also points out that 'anti-drug' campaigns are not necessarily effective, especially mass media campaigns based on scare tactics;

"Despite a broad range of educational and prevention approaches, most programmes do not prevent myths but perpetuate stereotypes and misinform the general public. Such programmes rely on sensationalized, exaggerated statements about cocaine which misinform about patterns of use, stigmatize users, and destroy the educator's credibility. This has given most education campaigns a naïve image and has reduced confidence in the quality and accuracy of these campaigns…" (pg. 23)

With regards to who uses cocaine, the study says,

"It is not possible to describe an "average cocaine user". An enormous variety was found in the types of people who use cocaine, the amount of drug used, the frequency of use, the duration and intensity of use, the reasons for using and any associated problems they experience.’"(pg. 1)

However it does usefully establish a continuum for use, noting that the majority of harms are accrued by the minority of users at the extreme of the continuum;

• experimental use
• occasional use
• situation-specific use
• intensive use
• compulsive/dysfunctional use

Experimental and occasional use are by far the most common types of use, and compulsive/dysfunctional is far less common." (pg. 28)

The study additionally notes - in direct conflict with the accepted drug war paradigm that all use equals abuse - that:

"occasional cocaine use does not typically lead to severe or even minor physical or social problems ... a minority of people start using cocaine or related products, use casually for a short or long period, and suffer little or no negative consequences, even after years of use. ... Use of coca leaves appears to have no negative health effects and has positive, therapeutic, sacred and social functions for indigenous Andean populations."

In addressing the rise in use, the report posits that key drivers are the drug's illicit status combined with both rising wealth (for cocaine powder) and increased poverty (for crack cocaine).

"The increasing attractiveness of cocaine in the past two decades may be related to:

• the "glamour" of illicit drug use in general;
• increased wealth allowing more people access to what they believe is the most glamorous of all illicit drugs;
• widespread poverty or social disadvantage in countries such as the USA at a time when cheap coca preparations like crack have become widely available." (pg. 14)
  

The report was never officially published and according to the WHO it does not exist, however some of the project advisors are now pushing for it to be formally published. It has only emerged into the public domain because the relevant documents were leaked and found their way into the hands of the Transnational Institute drugs and democracy programme.

The suppression of this detailed, authoritative and independent report is yet more evidence of how certain governments, most conspicuously the US, have willfully refused to develop rational drug policy based on science and evidence - and worse, when evidence emerges that challenges their political prerogatives and drug war ideologies they will resort to bullying, threats and censorship to ensure it is suppressed. This is anti-science drug war posturing of the worst kind, and can only lead to poor policy development with increased social and personal costs the inevitable result.

Transform has passed this report on to the forthcoming Home Affairs Select Committee inquiry on cocaine in the hope that it might usefully be used to inform policy discussions, albeit only at the UK level for now, and some 13 years late.

Also from Transform:

• From soft drink to hard drug; a snapshot of coca, cocaine and crack, By Mike Jay
  
  
• How cocaine markets have been hit by the financial crisis
  
  
• Transform publishes comparative cost benefit analysis of prohibition vs regulation of cocaine and heroin
  
  
• Shoveling water: War on drugs - War on people (film about coca eradication)
  
  
• It is not coca growing per se that fuels the conflict in Colombia, but the fact that cocaine is illegal

UNintended Consequences - side effects and contra indications of global prohibition

They may be the UNintended consequences of the drug ‘control’ system, but they show that the entire prohibitionist apparatus should come with an explicit health warning.

The UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs completes its marathon session on evaluating the ‘success’ of the drug control system tomorrow, and the ‘coalition of the willing (and not so willing)’ march out of the building, not quite in lock step, but maintaining de facto support for the global war on drugs. It is timely to examine whether these ‘unintended’ consequences, can still be seen as 'unanticipated'.


In March 2008 Antonio Maria Costa, Director of UNODC published ‘Making drug control ‘fit for purpose’: Building on the UNGASS decade’

It was a groundbreaking document. Whilst the conclusion still calls for prohibition to be implemented better, some of its critical analysis is spot on:

“The drug control system has succeeded in containing the drugs problem to less than 5% of the adult population (aged 15-64) of the world. This refers to annual prevalence: those who have used drugs at least once in the year prior to the survey. Problem drug users are limited to less than one tenth of this already low percentage” p.3

Which means that he concedes that 90% use non-problematically.

“The ways in which the drug control system has been implemented have had several unintended consequences: the criminal black market, policy displacement, geographical displacement, substance displacement and the marginalization of users.” P.20

It also identifies the enforcement of prohibition as responsible for:

• A criminal market worth $320 billion that is destabilizing entire nation states and filling prisons the world over


• Public health is marginalized in favour of enforcement, to the extent that 1 in 3 of those (outside Africa) who are infected with HIV/AIDS, contracted it through needle sharing


• The balloon effect – meaning that where the Golden Triangle once supplied the opium trade, it is now Afghanistan and where the Caribbean once carried much of the transit of cocaine, now West Africa suffers from its corrupting effect


• The discrimination that users suffer throughout the world because their drugs are prohibited and therefore they are demonised

This first dig at the reform movement doesn't appear until page 14!

“Vacillation is also prescribed by more than one tract on drug policy reform, exhorting the world to renounce ‘prohibition’ and espouse ‘legalization.’ The temptation to find a simple solution, the proverbial ‘silver bullet’ is timeless, but ultimately chimerical. Improving the performance of the control system is however both necessary and possible.” p.14

Amazingly, despite his realistic analysis, he still repeats the drug free world nonsense again.

“We need, first and foremost, to ‘finish the job’ on heroin and cocaine: a job we began a century ago and reiterated at UNGASS. The Political Declaration adopted at UNGASS, committed States Members [to]:

“…to developing strategies with a view to eliminating or reducing significantly the illicit cultivation of the coca bush, the cannabis plant and the opium poppy by the year 2008.” P.15

He also notes that:

“Unless we make strategic choices, prioritizing those areas where we have real competency and comparative advantage, and where we can leverage resources and expand partnerships, we risk wasting public money and delivering ineffective programmes.” P.16

and..

“It [the paper] ends with an appeal to the States Members of the United Nations, and through them, to those who are enshrined in the first words of the Charter, “the peoples of the United Nations”: we must work together to solve the world’s drug problem, not by losing ourselves in pointless debates from extreme positions, but by occupying the centre– the proverbial ‘middle ground’ – which is wide enough to accommodate all of us and solid enough to bear our weight as we step forward into the next decade.” P.20

Oh dear, a pointless debate… maybe he should take a look at our extensive archive of those calling for change in our voices for reform.

In March 2009, in advance of the High Level Meeting in Vienna, Costa published ‘Organized Crime and its Threat to Security – Tackling a disturbing consequence of drug control’. This paper is a much more focused document on opportunities for organised crime that arise from the implementation of the drug “control” system. But it also comes with a much more pointed smear of those who differ from the UNODC line on enforcement. This is the first sentence of the summary:

“crime and corruption associated with the drug trade are providing strong evidence to a vocal minority of pro-drug lobbyists to argue that the cure is worse than the disease, and that drug legalization is the solution.” P. i

Clearly the aim is to inure the UNODC against charges of complacency by recognising that there are negative consequences of global prohibition, and absolving themselves of responsibility by labelling them as ‘unintended’. At the same time, it attempts to undermine claims by Transform and others in the reform movement (we are as pro-drug, as UNODC is pro-mafia) that these consequences call into question the entire apparatus of global prohibition.

The identification of harms caused by global prohibition is nothing new. A devastating critique was published by the UK Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit in 2003 (eventually leaked in full to the media in 2005). However, the March 2008 paper was the first real admission from the UN that there were huge unintended consequences.

The use of the term 'unintended consequences' is very similar to the phrase ‘collateral damage’, used in military situations as a euphemism for dead and injured civilians. What we are talking about here are drug war casualties.

It is unquestionable that these consequences are both undesirable and unintended by UNODC. No UN bodies want to enrich the Mafia, for example. However, should they have been unanticipated, given what we knew about alcohol Prohibition?

It is also interesting to compare this with the way that doctors describe ‘Side Effects’ of drugs – effects from treatments that are unwanted, and have a negative effect on patients’ health. The issue of side effects from medical treatments is dealt with in a very different way than Mr Costa deals with the unintended consequences he identifies. Side effects are a significant issue of discussion between patient and doctor as part of a comprehensive exploration of a treatment package. What takes place is effectively a cost-benefit analysis of a particular intervention or series of interventions.

As result of the knowledge of side effects, all treatments carry a health warning. I don’t remember seeing one of those on the UN Conventions.

WARNING – Enforcing the Drug Control System causes more harm than drugs

In the UK we operate the Yellow Card system whereby doctors, and importantly patients and carers, can report negative effects to a body of oversight. Genuine civil society involvement in global drug policy development, anyone? How about reporting unintended consequences as part of the feedback of member states to the annual UN World Drug Report?

Last, but by no means least, orthodox medical interventions are also accompanied by a list of situations in which the treatment is contra-indicated. One can only wonder at the extensive list of places where global drug prohibition would be contra-indicated:-

• Fragile states – Afghanistan, Colombia, Guinea Bissau
  


• Governments of transit countries with a propensity for knee jerk military enforcement responses – Mexico
  


• Industrialised countries with high levels of inequality, disenfranchised non-white populations, and draconian criminal justice systems – US and UK
  


• Anywhere with established organised criminal gangs and high levels of demand for drugs that fall under the prohibition – Too many to mention

What doctor would prescribe a one-size fits-all treatment for so many countries for whom prohibition is contra-indicated – Dr Costa of course and his prohibition-friendly group of world leaders.

What are the indications that the regime’s side effects are outweighing the benefits?

• The existence of ‘narco states’ involved in production and supply


• Cocaine and heroin cost more than their weight in gold (but use still rising)


• Large prison populations made up of significant proportion of drug related offenders


• Black people and other marginalised groups over-represented in prison populations


• Reactive enforcement costs that outweigh proactive ones


• A blanket refusal from senior politicians to debate the issue


• Challenges to status quo coming from across the political spectrum


• Policy makers who call for reform when they leave office (Mo Mowlam, Julian Critchley etc)

One of the key issues here is that of critical self-evaluation. In order to move beyond the current impasse in drug prohibition, key UN member states (E.g. G20 countries) and the UN bodies that oversee prohibition, must make the entire edifice subject to normative examination, including a full and frank articulation of the costs as well as benefits of the regime.

As a scientifically based primer that explores why we find it so difficult to self evaluate critically, I strongly recommend: ‘Mistakes were made (but not by me)’ Why We Justify Foolish Beliefs, Bad Decisions, and Hurtful Acts

If the UN drug agencies cannot collectively admit that a war on drugs is a singularly inappropriate treatment regime for us all, then we will need to find another forum to develop global drug policy that is effective, just and humane.

For more on Transform's take on the Vienna process, see:

• UN Bodies Betray Principles of Peace
  
  


• Fear Prevails at the UN

Thanks to Ben Goldacre for advice on side effects and the Yellow Card System
Thanks to wordle for the word montage

United Nations Drug Policy - the Skeptics Chime In

This short flim produced by the HCLU in conjunction with uber-blog Boing Boing provides commentary from various figures in the drug policy reform movement on the current events at the UN in Vienna where the Commission on Narcotic Drugs is meeting to determine global drug strategy for the next ten years. (Danny from Transform appears in the film).





See also

• Fear prevails at the UN as voices for drug law reform are smeared
  
  
• UN bodies betray principles of peace by supporting the war on drugs

The Future of Harm Reduction: The US and the countdown to Vienna

The latest on this story from Reuters (including transform quote) and more importantly, given the high level audience in the States, a New York Times editorial ( below).

Update: The Guardian 03.02.09: Rift with EU as US sticks to Bush line on 'war on drugs' (including Transform quote)

from Reuters

U.S. and Europe split over drugs policy

By Luke Baker

LONDON (Reuters) - U.N.-sponsored negotiations on a new global drugs strategy are close to breaking down, with profound divisions between Europe and the United States on key policy issues, participants at the talks in Vienna say.

The problem is that U.S. negotiators are trying to push through anti-drug programmes that were promoted during the former Bush administration but which are no longer advocated by President Barack Obama, they said .

Whereas former President George W. Bush believed in a zero-tolerance approach in the war on drugs, one of Obama's first moves was to back the lifting of a ban on federal funding for needle-exchange programmes. He also gave tacit support to so-called "harm-reduction" strategies that are seen as crucial in the fight against drug-related diseases such as HIV/Aids.

The Vienna stand-off, which threatens to scupper a March summit at which the new drug policy declaration is to be signed, has prompted Democrats in Congress to write to the new U.S. ambassador to the United Nations calling for intervention.

Drug policy campaigners say that without a change in the U.S. position, anti-drug strategies could be set back for the next decade and have a knock-on impact on the spread of HIV/Aids and other diseases.

"We understand that the U.S. delegation in Vienna has been actively blocking the efforts of some of our closest allies -- including the European Union -- to incorporate in the declaration reference to harm reduction measures, such as needle exchange," read the letter, sent to Susan Rice on Wednesday and signed by California Congressman Henry Waxman, among others.

The U.S. delegation should be given new instructions from the new administration, it said.

"Otherwise, we risk crafting a U.N. declaration that is at odds with our own national policies and interests, even as we needlessly alienate our nation's allies in Europe."

Officials close to the U.S. negotiators in Vienna denied that Bush-era policies were being "rammed through" but said instructions from Obama administration had not been received.

"We are currently hearing out proposals, keeping options open and Washington informed. Our new administration will continue to review and develop our negotiating positions," a spokeswoman for the U.S. mission in Vienna said:

THE NEEDLE AND THE DAMAGE DONE

The Vienna negotiations, under the auspices of the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, have been going on intermittently for several months but are due to wrap up before a summit on March 12-13 when the new declaration is due to be signed.

While the United States is the chief proponent of a zero-tolerance approach to the estimated $160 billion (111.9 billion pound) illegal drugs industry, it has support from Russia and Japan, neither of whom support 'harm reduction' policies, which can include medication-assisted therapy and drug legalisation.

The European Union's policy position is supported by Australia, Latin America and Iran, among others, all of whom favour policies that include harm-reduction measures.

Drug policy campaigners believe that if the United States could be brought closer to the European position, Japan, Russia and others including China and India would follow, potentially producing consensus on a new global drugs strategy.

"Time is very tight and the race is now on to change the instructions from U.S. officials before the ink dries on the previous administration's line," said Danny Kushlick, head of policy at Transform, a British drug policy foundation.

"The implications of changing the political line is enormous for those who have suffered under the U.S. administration's refusal to support basic harm reduction measures."

U.S. sources said that while it was not impossible that the negotiating position could be changed, it would only happen once new instructions were issued from Washington.

At the same time, while the Obama administration differs from Bush, it does not advocate all 'harm reduction' strategies, which can include drug consumption rooms, safe-injecting rooms, and providing heroin and needles in prisons.

(Additional reporting by Mark Heinrich in Vienna)

(Editing by Angus MacSwan)

from the New York Times:

Time lag in Vienna

"Programs that give drug addicts access to clean needles have been shown the world over to slow the spread of deadly diseases including H.I.V./AIDS and hepatitis. Public health experts were relieved when President Obama announced his support for ending a ban on federal funding for such programs.

Unfortunately, Mr. Obama’s message seems not to have reached the American delegation to a United Nations drug policy summit in Vienna, where progress is stalled on a plan that would guide global drug control and AIDS prevention efforts for years to come. The delegation has angered allies, especially the European Union, by blocking efforts to incorporate references to the concept of “harm reduction” — of which needle exchange is a prime example — into the plan.

State Department officials said that they were resisting the harm-reduction language because it could also be interpreted as endorsing legalized drugs or providing addicts with a place to inject drugs. But the Vienna plan does not require any country to adopt policies it finds inappropriate. And by resisting the harm-reduction language, the American delegation is alienating allies and sending precisely the wrong message to developing nations, which must do a lot more to control AIDS and other addiction-related diseases.

Some members of Congress are rightly angry about the impasse in Vienna. On Wednesday, three members fired off a letter to Susan Rice, the new American ambassador to the United Nations, urging that the United States’ delegation in Vienna be given new marching orders on the harm-reduction language. If that doesn’t happen, the letter warns, “we risk crafting a U.N. declaration that is at odds with our own national policies and interests, even as we needlessly alienate our nation’s allies in Europe.”

Lords debate alternatives to drug prohibition

update: debate transcript below

Transform Drug Policy Foundation

Media release 20/01/09

No embargo

Lords to debate alternatives to drug prohibition

The House of Lords will be debating ‘the United Nations Declaration on countering the world drug problem’, in the Main Chamber, January 21st at 11am. The debate is led by Baroness Meacher (cross bench) who will call on the Government to follow the recommendation of the 2002 Home Affairs Select Committee to debate alternatives to prohibition at UN level (see notes to editors below) at this year’s upcoming 10 year review of UN drug policy in Vienna.

Baroness Meacher said:

“Criminalising drug users has clearly not reduced the problems we face, and has only served to exacerbate the harm caused by drugs. It is time for policy makers at all levels, including the UN drug agencies, to move away from the failings of drug war ideology and embrace a new approach guided by sound evidence and public health principles. There is now an urgent need for and mature and balanced exploration of policy alternatives, including the potential legal regulation of some or all currently illegal drugs”.

ends

Notes to editors:

Home Affairs Select Committee Report: “The Government's Drugs Policy: Is it Working?”

Recommendation 24:

"That the Government initiates a discussion within the Commission on Narcotic Drugs of alternative ways - including the possibility of legalisation and regulation - to tackle the global drugs dilemma."

----------------------

Read the debate transcript here

Media coverage:

Guardian news in brief

UN special rapporteur documents systematic torture of drug suspects in Indonesia

I recently came across a UN report, published in March, by Manfred Nowak, the UN's Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, in which he chronicles the shocking mistreatment routinely meted out by police upon drug suspects in Indonesia. The report makes for grim reading and whilst not specifically focused on drugs policy it comes as little surprise that drug suspects form a substantial proportion of the abuse victims he details. Nowak notes that:

"Indonesia has not outlawed torture under its criminal legislation. Indonesian law does not contain an explicit prohibition of torture. This, combined with the absence of procedural safeguards against torture, the lack of independent monitoring mechanisms and of effective complaints mechanisms results in a system of quasi-total impunity."

It is hoped that this report, and its public dissemination, will lead to a change in enforcement culture in Indonesia, and highlight that everyone has inalienable human rights, including not being tortured whilst in custody, regardless of the offense. The UN declaration of Human Rights preamble states that:

'Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.'

'Everyone' includes drug users, drug suspects, and drug criminals.

The following are directly quoted from Nowak's report:

"22. The overwhelming majority of the detainees interviewed indicated that the ill-treatment was used primarily to extract confessions or, in the cases of drug-related crimes, to receive information on drug suppliers. In a number of cases detainees were offered to be spared in return for the payment of a substantial amount of money. Those interlocutors who had been already tried reported in unison that their coerced confessions had been used during the court proceedings and that objections they had raised were not considered by the judge, prosecutor or even their own legal aid clerk. Furthermore, they were not aware of any complaints mechanism to which they could address their grievances expecting any kind of outcome."

"64. Whereas in some police stations he did not receive any allegations of ill-treatment, in other facilities, in particular in urban areas, torture and ill-treatment is used routinely to extract confessions or in the context of drug charges to reveal dealers/suppliers. In three police stations, the Special Rapporteur arrived while beatings were taking place, and in several places he found persistent medical evidence of several types of ill-treatment, which are in line with reports by prisoners and various other credible sources received prior and during his visit."

"23. Achmad Alfian, aged 20, was arrested by officers of Polsek Tanabang in July 2006 while buying drugs. Although he did not resist, he was handcuffed and beaten with the but of a gun on his head. He was then transferred to the Polsek. During the ensuing interrogation he was beaten with a rubber stick all over his body, but particularly on his head and back in order to force him to confess to being a drug seller. Mr. Alfian refused and was charged. Furthermore, he had to pay 500 000 IDR (about 53 $US) for being put in a cell which was supposed to be of better quality than the others. In September 2006, Mr. Alfian was transferred to Pondok Bambu pre-trial detention facility. He constantly feels dizzy and has headaches."

"73. Detainee, aged 40, accused of a drug crime, was arrested on 27 August 2007 by seven drug police officers under the command of Iptu Alawah in his room in Jayapura. Upon his arrest he was handcuffed, forced to sit and beaten and kicked by them. They reportedly also stepped on his body and legs. He further complained about the lack of food."

"80. R., aged 25, from Makassar, was arrested on 25 May 2006 by the drug police. He was kicked in the stomach and hit on the face in the street for one hour, when he refused to tell where his drugs came from. He was then transferred to POLSEC Mamadjanj, where the beatings continued and he was hit with wooden sticks and hands all night until he told the names of the drug sellers."

"109. Mr. Zulfiqaraw, aged 40, from Lahore, Pakistan, was arrested at Jakarta Airport in November 2004 on allegations of drug related offences. While he was abroad the police raided his apartment in Jakarta which he shared with a friend who possessed drugs. Despite the friend’s confession and assurances that Mr. Zulfiqaraw was not involved in any drug related matter, the police took Mr. Zulfiqaraw from the airport to a private house, where he was tortured for three days. He was frequently punched, kicked and threatened with being shot unless he would confess. Nobody knew his whereabouts. After three days his health deteriorated so much that he had to be taken to the police hospital, where he was treated for 17 days. Subsequently, he was transferred to Polda Jakarta where he spent two and a half months in official police custody. The prosecutor in charge, Mr. Hutagaol, offered to drop any charges for a payment of 400 million IDR (about 42,700 $US). Mr. Zulfiqaraw perceived his ensuing trial as strikingly unfair and biased against him since he is a foreigner. No convincing evidence was presented; during the trial session his judge fell asleep. He did not receive any legal aid although he was not able to finance a lawyer; his embassy was wrongly informed and failed to support him. He was sentenced to death."

"121. Eko, aged 28, law student from Blora, Central Java, was arrested by six police officers at his home on 23 December 2006 based on the order of the head of the drug unit of Polres Sleman. He was kicked and punched by the officers and then taken to the Polres where he was interrogated in the office of Mr. Kurniawan. During interrogation he was electrocuted, got hammer blows on his fingers and was beaten by four police officers for one hour. The police officers also banged a chair on his body and put it on his toes. Following this treatment, he confessed, and Mr. Kurniawan offered him to drop some charges in exchange for money. He did not receive any medial treatment for his wounds and scars but the other detainees gave him some medicine. He was kept in Polres police custody for two months and then transferred to the prison LP Cebongan where he spent six months. At the Polres visitors had to pay 10 000 IDR (1 $US) to see him. The Prosecutor at the District Court offered mitigation in exchange of money. The Prosecutor was informed about the ill-treatment and the confession under torture, but this did not affect the outcome of the trial."

"127. On his way to the debriefing meeting with the authorities, the Special Rapporteur found Mr. Zulfikar, aged 20, accused of a drug related crime, who had just been tortured in office No. 50. He had been beaten with a stick and a white plastic pipe by four police officers named Briptu Arika (Reskrim); Briptu Safari S.Y. (SAT NARKOBA); Briptu Agmeg Jatmiko (SAT NARKOBA); and Briptu Opar S. (SAT NARKOBA), which left very clear and distinguishable marks on his arm. The Head of the Narcotics Unit (Andri Triasfoetra, SIK) tried to deny the Special Rapporteur access, arguing that his mandate does not cover persons outside detention places (i.e. under interrogation).

128. The findings of the forensic expert (who recorded the evidence) as well as Mr. Zulfikar’s girlfriend, whom the Special Rapporteur interviewed, confirmed that Mr. Zulfikar had been tortured. She had been arrested together with him and put in the room next to the office where Mr. Zulfikar was ill-treated. She reported that she had heard his screams. She was extremely afraid of the police officers and cried repeatedly when interviewed by the Special Rapporteur. Although Mr. Zulfikar and his girlfriend were both extremely afraid of reprisals for speaking with the Special Rapporteur and begged for protection, the request of the Special Rapporteur to release them was not complied with. "

"139. Suhenry, aged 34, from Aceh, was arrested by five officers of Polres South Jakarta District in November 2006 in connection with a drug related crime. In the course of the first three days he was repeatedly interrogated by two officers in an ordinary office room on the second floor with the aim of identifying his supplier. When Mr. Suhenry refused to indicate his name they pressed his hand on the desk and beat his palm and fingers with a hammer. Furthermore, they used electroshock devices to electrocute him and punched him all over the body. At one point, the officers offered to let him escape, however, Mr. Suhenry stayed since he believed that this was a trick in order to shoot him during what would be later presented as an attempt to flee. The officers also put a plastic bag over his head, but Mr. Suhenry managed to bite a hole in it enabling him to breath. Eventually, Mr. Suhenry confessed in order to end the torture."

"141. After having inspected the cells, the Special Rapporteur ran into Mohammed Tasroni, aged 17, from Jakarta, who was handcuffed to a chair in an office belonging to the drug unit on the fourth floor. Mr. Tasroni was in the process of being interrogated by Mr. Sudartianta (No. 65080313) and had very strong swellings on this face as well as other traces of recent beatings all over his body.

"142. Mr. Tasroni reported that he had been arrested a few hours earlier near the Jatinegara Train Station, East Jakarta. There, he had met an old acquaintance whom he had not seen for a very long time and who asked to provide him with a dose of marijuana. After Mr. Tasroni had arranged for the drugs and handed them over to the former, it turned out that he was actually an undercover police officer working for the pursuit and attack team (“Buser”) of the Criminal Investigation Department. Mr. Tasroni was arrested by several plain-clothes police officers and taken to a private house, which appeared to be an empty office building, in a civilian Kijang car. Once in the house, the officers started to punch and kick Mr. Tasroni all over his body and on his face. He was also heavily beaten on his back. Mr. Tasroni was told the beating would not stop unless he would reveal the identity of his drug dealer. The beating was inflicted in the presence and with the participation of Mr. Bambang (AKP), the chief of Unit III/Baya of the Narcotics
"

For more detailed and up to date coverage of drugs and human rights issues visit the IHRA HR2 blog. The HR2 team will be holding a joint event with HUman Rights Watch at the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva later this month. Details here.

Commentaries on UN conventions now available online

The International Harm Reduction Association recently received digital copies of the Official Commentaries on the 1961, 1971 and 1988 UN Drug Conventions, as well as the Commentary to the 1972 Protocol amending the 1961 Convention, from the Legal and Treaty Affairs team at UNODC, all now available online.

These four volumes, each several hundred pages in length, are the official (although non-binding) explanatory notes from the UN to member states on how to interpret each of the articles in the Conventions. In essence, the Commentaries put ‘meat on the bone’ in providing detailed guidance to states on what the drug conventions mean, don’t mean and how they are to be interpreted and implemented.

Unfortunately the pdf files for these important and hard to find documents are massive (some as much as 50mb each), and the IHRA HR2 team has been struggling to find a way to make them available online.

As an interim solution they have stored them on an online document storage website.

The 1971, 1972 and 1988 Commentaries are now available in English, Spanish and French at www.dropboks.com.

The 1988 Commentary is also available in Chinese, Arabic and Russian.

Simply enter the email address damon.barrett(at)ihra.net and the password commentaries

Bear in mind, however, that they are quite large in some cases and if you are on a dial up connection may take some time to download.

Unfortunately the Commentary to the 1961 Convention is too large even to go onto this website! However, it has been online (English only) for many years at DrugText.

IHRA are currently working out a permanent, faster and more simple solution which will include the English, French and Spanish versions of the 1961 Commentary.

UN asks NGOs for our view

A fortnight ago I attended the Vienna NGO Committee UN event that will feed into the review process for the UN’s ten-year drug strategy. With our newly gained accreditation from the UN I was invited to take part with 300 other NGOs to create a consensus document that will contribute (albeit in a very limited way) to the UN review.



In the room were NGOs from supporters of blanket prohibition to those supporting legalisation and regulation. I'm not going to go into the detail of the session, which was tortuous in the extreme, as we went through three draft resolutions line by line and word by word. Only time will tell whether it was worth the time and resources spent on the process. Although it could be the start of a more serious engagement by the UN with civil society.

For some intelligent video footage of NGO participants at the event, see the excellent work of the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union: Here and here

Other NGOs have already commented comprehensively in their blogs:

The American Civil Liberties Union

The International Harm Reduction Association

and The US Harm Reduction Coalition


image copyright Steve Rolles

The opium war's front line: Afghanistan, Iran and Hampshire

There has been a series of opium stories in the last couple of days that highlight some of the big questions in drug policy that the media and politicians rarely if ever want to mention, let alone explore in a rational and intelligent way.

First up was a report from the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) about how much profit the Taleban (BBC) or Taliban (Daily Mail) are making from Afghan opium production. The figure given is a charmingly rounded and media friendly (although somewhat Dr Evil-esq) one hundred million dollars, which is, according to the UNODC, 10% of the total value of Afghan opium harvest valued at a similarly nice round $1 billion.

"one hundred million dollars"

This announcement follows a curious pattern in similar UNODC missives, apparently torn between wanting to let people know how bad the drug crisis has become, so as to justify their existence (and expanding budgets), and at the same time studiously avoiding the fact that it is the quite staggering failure of the international drug control infrastructure they have overseen for the past 47 years that has allowed such disastrously destructive illegal markets to emerge (indeed thrive). A similarly bizarre 'look how useless international drug control is; we are needed more than ever' announcement was made about increased cocaine production in the Andes this week.

Interestingly UNODC Director Antonio Costa is at pains to point out that the failure of the billions poured into counter-narcotics operations in Afghanistan is even worse than was previously thought, with the Taleban moving into processing the opium into heroin, so as to make more money for the various unpleasant military and terrorist activities, and also noting that last year’s production was so massive (and by implication drug control so hopeless) that there is as much as 4000 tonnes of opium (enough to supply the global illicit market for a year) stockpiled somewhere across Afghanistan. This is disheartening news for the British troops (of whom over a hundred have now died, many whilst involved in anti drug operations); even if our boys achieve the impossible and prevent 100% of the opium production this year, the flow of opium will be essentially uninterrupted, and the whole hopeless charade will begin again next season. The miserable futility and human cost of this whole shamelessly political exercise is laid bare for all to see. There will doubtless be more bad news dressed up in as success in tomorrow’s UN World Drug Report. Watch this space.

Next, to Iran where it was announced 2 days ago that Iranian customs and police had intercepted a record 900 tonnes of opium, just over a third of the 2500 tonnes estimated to be entering the country in 2007 from neighbouring Afghanistan. Indeed Iran does have, by global standards, an impressive record in percentage terms for national drug seizure rates. But, and it deserves a capital B, not only did 1400 tonnes not get seized, but seizure rates (assuming the total estimate figures are correct) fell from 46% in 2006 and the total that got through actually increased. Moreover, since Iran upped its game on the interdiction front, the traffickers have done the logical thing and, being highly flexible and non-stupid, redirected or opened up new routes for getting their opium/heroin from Afghanistan to Western markets, mostly to the North through the former Soviet Republics and Baltic states. Thus it ever was with highly profitable markets run by organised criminals with more interest in making money than respecting traditions and national boundaries. Interestingly this analysis is not lost on the UNODC, which, again rather confusingly, is happy to proclaim local supply control successes whilst simultaneously revealing the stunning failure of the bigger picture regards total drug production - (often in the same press release, with last week’s cocaine press release being a splendid example). Indeed UNODC director Costa, an economist by trade, has made it very clear in public statements and publications that he understands this analysis of the brutal realities of supply and demand economics within a completely unregulated and highly profitable illicit trade (see for example here and here). The Iranian success, needless to say, has had no more impact on heroin supplies in the West than the recent UNODC trumpeted Afghan mega cannabis bust/nuking had on cannabis supplies (note how the ever scientific Daily Mail claims in this report "that Officials believe the area - near to the Taliban stronghold of Quetta in Pakistan - was turning dried cannabis leaves into heroin." - Im no biochemist but I'm positive that's not feasible)

And so finally to the sun dappled meadows of rural Southern England which, we are informed in a classic Daily Mail non-scoop, are now "The opium fields of England", in which "heroin-producing poppies [are] grown to make NHS pain-relief drugs" (since 2002). Unfortunately, nowhere in the Mail coverage do we learn that one the 'NHS pain-relief drugs' made from said poppies is in fact heroin. More significantly perhaps, we also do not learn that some of this 100% legal heroin 'made from heroin-producing poppies' 'identical to the plant used to produce heroin' is then legally prescribed to around 400 long term UK based heroin addicts, in injectable form, as part of a maintenance/stabilisation/treatment program. Indeed fact fans will be interested to learn that Macfarlan Smith, mentioned in the Daily Mail piece, are the only company licensed to buy poppies to produce opiates in the UK (there's another story here about their monopoly abuse pricing policy that means UK heroin is six times as expensive as in Holland but that will have to wait for another time). Also farmers do not require a license to grow opium poppies but are apparently required to inform the Police about cultivation. The licensing of the cultivation of legal opium (which until last year's bumper Afghan harvest was actually more than 50% of total global opium production) in the UK and elsewhere (primarily Tasmania, India and Turkey, but also Spain and Norway), its transit around the world, and its processing into various opiate drugs, including heroin, is overseen by...the UNODC.

Class A drug production in a field near you

As an aside the Daily Mail is also not exactly correct when they claim that: "Extracting opium from the poppies and turning it into morphine – or heroin" is "complex and expensive". Making morphine and heroin is tricky, but extracting opium - which is itself a potentially potent and addictive substance, is simple enough, requiring only some basic scraping of opium gum from the scarred poppy heads or a simple boiling and reduction process. Opium poppy seeds can be bought in any garden center and growing them is not illegal (odd in some ways that many of the UK's opiate users haven’t latched onto this). You can actually buy opium poppy heads, from which opium can be easily extracted, from most craft shops, and I even saw them for sale in IKEA the other day. Yes, you probably have some Class A drugs nestling in that dried flower arrangement on your mantle piece and don’t even know it. If you get bored and are not averse to risk and law breaking, I'm reliably informed you need about 12 heads for a decent dose.

But back to the real issue here. The opium poppies growing in those fields all over Hampshire and the South East (you can actually see one from just outside Didcot Parkway station for frequent London to Bristol train travelers like me), whilst botanically identical in every way to those growing in the wilds of Helmland province, have some significant and one would have thought fairly obvious distinctions. They are not funding nasty military operations by oppressive
Islamic militants, extremists and terrorists; the profits from their production and supply are going to farmers and legitimate companies. The heroin they are used to produce is 100% legal, is prescribed by doctors and used relatively safely by their patients – whom as a result are not dying of overdoses, getting HIV or Hep C through needle sharing, getting nasty infections from contaminated street drugs and dirty needles, robbing you, me, or your granny in the street, burgling your house, or prostituting themselves to raise money to pay the inflated prices demanded by illicit markets run by violent gangsters and street dealers.

We can keep on trying to eradicate production, cross our fingers that it’ll work one day (20 years was the latest plucked-from-nowhere estimate from DFID and the World Bank) and that when it does opiate addiction will be a thing of the past.

Or, back in the real world, experience suggests we need to take a different, arguably more pragmatic approach and firstly expand the model that is already in place, is 100% legal and operational under domestic and international law, and unlike the desperate and demonstrably futile interdiction efforts the UNODC and UK Government continue to back (at terrible human cost), is based on an extensive evidence base to prove its effectiveness on key public health and criminal justice indicators. Quite simply; every dependent opiate user brought within the legal system will reduce the demand for Afghan opium and horrors associated with its production, supply and use.

Do not expect to read this last paragraph in tomorrow's UN World Drug Report